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Congressmen, the Ball is in Your Court:
Grupo Mexicano de Desarrollo v. Alliance Bond Fund
I. Introduction
The Supreme Court in the 5-4 decision Grupo Mexicano De Desarrollo v. Alliance
Bond Fund' ruled that "the federal district court lacked the authority, in an action for
money damages, to issue a preliminary injunction preventing note issuer from disposing
of assets in which note holders who sought an injunction claimed no lien or equitable
interest." The Court held that the law would not support the grant of preliminary in-
junctions to prevent the disbursement of assets, maintaining "[c]ongress is in a much
better position ... to design the appropriate remedy" for claimants.2 Alliance Bond
Fund has held that in equity cases, defendants may potentially continue to frustrate
judgments. Legislative reform is the one avenue of protection that can guarantee the
creditor's ability to enforce a potential judgment. This Note evaluates Alliance Bond
Fund, its holding, reasoning, and ramifications. Ultimately, the need to protect Ameri-
can investors in the age of fast-moving capital and an interdependent economy should
fuel congressional involvement in establishing a legal remedy.
A hypothetical illustrates the importance of protecting investors. Suppose, for ex-
ample, a group of individuals who are employed or associated with a bank, conduct a
scheme to defraud the bank. The scheme involves draining the bank of assets through
breaches of loyalty and fiduciary duty. Through a pattern of fraudulent racketeering
activity the group devised a "heist money" scheme to use $3,000,000.00 of the bank's
assets in an attempt to purchase $9,000,000.00 in stolen currency. Fearing the culprits
will begin to dissipate this lump sum of money, the bank seeks to obtain a preliminary
injunction. 3 Currently, the bank-creditor will lose this motion. The remedy sought is one
that is "at law." 4 Therefore, while courts have already hesitated to protect creditors
through grant of preliminary injunctions, the Supreme Court's position in Alliance Bond
Fund instructs federal courts to remain cautious.
Section I provides an introduction to Alliance Bond Fund and its facts, while Section
II delves into the history of interlocutory injunctions beginning with the legal system. A
brief overview of the chief cases involving preliminary injunctions prior to Alliance
Bond Fund is contained in Section III. Sections IV and V deal solely with the Court's
reasoning in Alliance Bond Fund, particularly the flaws of the opinion and their ramifi-
cations. Section VI explores various areas of law where preliminary injunctions are
already available. Lastly, Section VII discusses both the status of creditors and debtors
after Alliance Bond Fund, and introduces Haven v. Poland5 , a case illustrating how at
1. Grupo Mexicano de Desarrollo, S.A. v. Alliance Bond Fund, Inc., 527 U.S. 308, 119 S. Ct. 1961
(1999).
2. Id. at 1970.
3. Federal Deposit Ins. Corp. v. Antonio, 649 F. Supp 1352. (D.Colo. 1986).
4. To determine a remedy as law or equity, courts look to history and the nature of the remedy, looking to
common law and whether it merely declares the law, relying on the execution process for enforcement (in
which case it will be deemed legal) or whether it is in personam and then it is an equitable relief. DAN D.
DOBBS, LAW OF REMEDIES § 2.1,2.2, 2.6 (2d ed. 1993).
5. 68 F. Supp. 2d 947 (N.D.1I. 1999).
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least one federal district court reconciled Alliance Bound Fund with public policy con-
cerns for protecting creditors.
H. The Facts of Alliance Bond Fund
In February 1994, the Mexican holding company Grupo Mexican de Desarrollo
(GMD) issued $250 million of 8.25% unsecured, guaranteed notes due in 2001. A group
of American investment funds purchased unsecured notes from GMD. Interest payments
were due in February and August of every year. The notes were guaranteed by four sub-
sidiaries of GMD. American investment funds purchased $75 million of the notes.
GMD participated in a toll road construction program sponsored by the Mexican
government between 1990 and 1994. GMD invested in the concessionaires and also
were among the companies granted a contract to build the toll roads. Difficulties in the
Mexican economy resulted in large losses that left the concessionaires unable to pay
contractors like GMD.
The Mexican government, to remedy the situation, instituted a Toll Road Rescue
Program. Under this program, the Mexican government issued guaranteed notes to the
concessionaires in exchange for their ceding to the government ownership of the toll
roads. GMD was to receive approximately $309 million of Toll Road Notes under the
program. The Toll Road Notes were used, in turn, to pay the bank debt of the conces-
sionaires and also to pay outstanding receivables held by GMD and other contractors.
Due to further economic difficulties in the Mexican economy, GMD found itself in seri-
ous financial troubles. In order to remedy the situation, GMD publicly announced that it
would place in trust its right to receive $17 million of Toll Road Notes, as well as trans-
fer to the Mexican government its right to receive $100 million of Toll Road Notes.
Despite attempts to restructure its debts with creditors, including Mexican banks and
both Mexican and American investors, negotiations with the American Bond Fund
failed. Subsequently, Respondents accelerated the principal amount of their notes, filing
suit for the amount due in the United States District Court for the Southern District of
New York. In the complaint, Respondents alleged that "GMD is at risk of insolvency, if
not already insolvent."6 Respondents appreciated GMD's incentive to dissipate its as-
sets. Particularly, Alliance Bond Fund feared that assets received from dissipation of
Toll Road Notes would go to GMD's Mexican creditors, which would "frustrate any
judgment" 7 Respondents could obtain.
In their suit, Respondents sought breach-of-contract damages in the amount of $80.9
million, and requested a preliminary injunction to restrain Petitioners from transferring
the Toll Road Notes or receivables. The District Court entered a temporary restraining
order, stating:
the Toll Road Notes were GMD's 'only substantial asset'; that GMD planned to use
the Toll Road Notes 'to satisfy its Mexican creditors to the exclusion of [respon-
dents] and other holders of the Notes'; that 'in light of [petitioners'] financial condi-
tion and dissipation of assets, any judgment [respondents] obtain in this action will
be frustrated'; that respondents had demonstrated irreparable injury; and that it was
'almost certain' that respondents would succeed on the merits of their claim.8
The temporary injunction operated to prevent Petitioners from "dissipating, dis-
bursing, transferring, conveying, encumbering or otherwise distributing or affecting any





[petitioner's] right to, interest in, title to or right to receive or retain, any of the [Toll
Road Notes]." 9 The District Court then ordered the Respondents to post a $50,000 bond.
On appeal, the Second Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed the lower court's decision to
grant the preliminary injunction.' °
m. The Development of the Interlocutory Injunction
"[Tihe equity jurisdiction of the federal courts is the jurisdiction in equity exercised
by the High Court of Chancery in England at the time of the adoption of the Constitution
and the enactment of the original Judiciary Act [of] 1789." 11 Therefore, the roots of
interlocutory injunctions in the United States can be traced to interlocutory injunctions
in the history of the English legal system.
It is well settled that interlocutory injunctions have a colorful history dating back to
the Anglo-Saxon legal system during nineteenth-century England.' 2 At one time, the
standards for granting interlocutory injunctions were identifiable without much diffi-
culty. Judges usually exercised broad discretion in areas of equity jurisdiction, merely
asking "whether the case is so clear and so free from objection upon the grounds of eq-
uitable consideration, that the Court ought to interfere by injunction with a previous trial
at law."'
' 3
The standard further developed so as to require the plaintiff to show that there is a
'substantial question' to be decided. 14 The merger of law and equity in the English High
Court of Justice eliminated the need for equity to "look quite so nervously over its
shoulder at potential allegations of lack of jurisdiction."' 5 The result was the formation
of criteria for judges to use before granting an interlocutory injunction. The model de-
veloped requires a plaintiff seeking an injunction of this kind to demonstrate a strong
prima facie case.
When the colonies established their legal system, they borrowed notions of equity
jurisdiction. However, along with the English model for granting interlocutory injunc-
tions came a deep-rooted resentment of equity jurisprudence. I6 Thus, American courts
did little to develop the jurisprudence of applying injunctive relief, and instead drew
upon "the precedents of Courts of Chancery of England.' 17 The D.C. Circuit Court, in
Virginia Petroleum Jobbers Association v. F.P. C., 18 was the first circuit court to enunci-
ate four factors for consideration when granting an injunction. The four factors include:
(1) Has the petitioner made a strong showing that they are likely to prevail on the
merits of their appeal?
9. Id.
10. Alliance Bond Fund, Inc. v. Grupo Mexicano De Desarrollo, S.A., 143 F.3d 688, 698 (2d Cir. 1998).
11. Alliance Bond Fund, 119 S. Ct at 1968.
12. See generally R. Grant Hammond, Interlocutory Injunctions: Time for a New Model?, 30 U. TORONTO
L.J. 240 (1980).
13. Saunders v. Smith, 40 Eng. Rep. 1100, 1107 (1837) (Cottenham, LC)(quoted in Hammond, supra n.
13, at 242).
14. Hammond, supra n. 242.
15. Id. at 243.
16. Id. at 246-47. "Among the English common people there was a deeply rooted sentiment of attachment
to the Saxon trial by jury and of aversion to the 'one-man power' of adjudication. The colonists who settled
America brought something of this sentiment with them; there appears in the colonial age to have been real
fear of the Court of Chancery as a possible engine for arbitrary power." Id., quoting STORY, COMMENTARIES
ON EQUITY JURISPRUDENCE I (10th ed 1970), at 49ff.
17. Charles River Bridge v. Warren Bridge 23 Mass. (6 Pick.) 376, at 395 and 401 (1828).
18. 259 F.2d 921,925 (D.C. Cir. 1958)..
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(2) Has the petitioner shown that without such relief they will suffer irreparable
injury?
(3) Will the stay substantially harm other parties interested in the proceeding?
(4) How will the public interest be affected?
Subsequent to the D.C. Circuit Court's initial definition of the four interlocutory
injunction factors, circuit courts developed three primary approaches to the factors'
application. The first method, the "sequential" approach, applied in Intercontinental
Container Transportation Corp. v. New York Shipping Association, 19 instructs courts to
treat the factors as individual hurdles, requiring that each be passed before any injunc-
tion is granted.2 0 The second approach, and the one endorsed in Virginia Petroleum, is
known as the "balancing" test. This approach considers all the factors as equally rele-
vant, weighing all factors concurrently, treating none as being dispositive.2 1 Lastly, few
circuit courts apply an approach that requires a showing of "either (1) probable success
on the merits and possible irreparable injury, or (2) sufficiently serious questions going
to the merits to make them a fair ground for litigation and a balance of hardships tipping
decidedly toward the party requesting the preliminary relief.
22
The history of preliminary injunctions both in England and in the United States re-
flects its dynamic nature. Though both systems have applied it reluctantly and at times
inconsistently, the fact that the preliminary injunction has endured the test of time dem-
onstrates the necessity and effectiveness of it as a remedy.
IV. Interlocutory Injunctions Prior to Alliance Bond Fund
The Supreme Court prior to Alliance Bond Fund had addressed the issue of prelimi-
nary injunctions in three cases, United States v. First National City Bank,23 Deckert v.
Independence Shares Corp.,
24 and De BEERS Consol. Mines Ltd. v. United States.
25
First in the series was Deckert, where the Supreme Court in 1940 authorized an inter-
locutory order granting an injunction. In contrast, five years later, the Court denied the
government the right to freeze an antitrust iolator's assets pending the outcome of a
government suit for injunctive relief in De BEERS. The only way preliminary injunctive
relief could have been granted, the Court held, was if the injunction was disobeyed, if
contempt proceedings were brought, if a fine was levied, if the fine was not paid, and if
execution was then sought on the assets. Finally, in First National the Court performed
another about-face and found the issuance of an injunction pursuant to 26 U.S.C.
§740226 was a proper exercise of the equity power of the District Court, particularly
because it was acting in the public interest.
19. 426 F.2d 884 (2d. Cir. 1970).
20. Hammond, supra n. 13 at 262.
21. Id.
22. Id. at 263.
23, 379 U.S. 378 (1965) (where the government sought to enjoin the bank from transferring the property
of the taxpayer, a Uruguayan corporation, to protect its jeopardy income tax assessment. See I.R.C. § 7204(a)
(1976) ("necessary or appropriate for the enforcement of the Internal Revenue Code")).
24. 311 U.S. 282 (1940).
25. 325 U.S. 212 (1945).
26. 26 U.S.C. §7402 (1994).
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Described above is a series of conflicting opinions. First, the Deckert Court found it
an appropriate exercise of equity jurisdiction pursuant to the Securities Act, which does
not expressly provide for injunctive relief.27 The Court found the authority to grant an
injunction in that situation despite a lack of an express remedy set out in the SEC stat-
ute. The majority opinion explains: "the Act as a whole indicates an intention to estab-
lish a statutory right which the litigant may enforce in designated courts by such legal or
equitable actions or procedures as would normally be available to him., 2 8 After finding
that an interlocutory injunction was within the "legal or equitable actions" normally
available to a plaintiff in Deckert, the Court in De BEERS ruled that it was no longer
normally available to a plaintiff because that case was not brought pursuant to a stat-
ute.29 The Court stated, "the injunction issued in this case was not authorized either by
statute or by the usage of equity and that the decree granting the injunction should be
reversed. '30 This position is entirely in conflict with the position taken by the Court in
Deckert where, pursuant to a SEC statute, equity principles allowed interlocutory in-
junctions in money damages cases. 31 Finally, the Court once again changes course and
holds in First National that interlocutory injunctions are within the powers of equity
jurisdiction, inherent in the internal revenue law.32 The statute, 26 U.S.C. § 7402, 3 3
lacked an express provision for granting injunctions, however in spite of this fact, the
Court found it to be within equity powers.34
The lower courts responded to the Supreme Court's divergent decisions by devel-
oping various justifications for injunctive relief. The Fifth Circuit, in Productos Carnic,
S.A. v. Central Am. Beef & Seafood Trading Co.,3 5 upheld an order requiring that the
proceeds of a sale, allegedly obtained by fraud, be preserved in an interest-bearing ac-
count pending the final result of the litigation.36 Without such an injunction, a substan-
tial risk existed that a "meaningful decision on the merits would be impossible" because
defendants, by disposing of the assets, could make "any judgment ultimately obtained
against [them] unenforceable."
37
Similarly, the Second Circuit in International Control Corp. v. Vesco 38 upheld an
order preventing the dissipation or impairment of assets located in the United States,
including a Boeing 707, corporate stock, and a yacht.39 Although the court acknowl-
edged that a preliminary injunction is an uncommon remedy, it concluded that it was
appropriate to preserve the status quo pendente lite where the balance of hardships tips
decidedly toward the party requesting the temporary relief, and that party has raised
questions going to the merits so serious, substantial, and difficult as to make them fair
ground for litigation.40 Similarly, the Second Circuit, in accord with the Supreme
Court's holding in Mills v. Electric Auto-Line Co., granted relief in SEC v. Manor
27. See id.
28. Id. at 287-88.
29. See De BEERS, 325 U.S. at 218
30. Id. at 223.
31. See Deckert, 311 U.S. at 290-91.
32. See First National, 379 U.S. at 385.
33. See supra note 27.
34. See Id. at 383.
35. 621 F.2d 683 (5thCir. 1980).
36. See Id. at 686-87.
37. Id. at 686.
38. 490 F.2d 1334 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 417 U.S. 932 (1974).
39. See id. at 1338.
40. Id. at 1347.
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Nursing Centers Inc. ,41 explaining:
Once the equity jurisdiction of the district court has been properly invoked by a
showing of a securities law violation, the Court possesses the necessary power to
fashion an appropriate remedy. Thus, while neither the 1933 nor 1934 Acts specifi-
cally authorize the ancillary relief granted in this case [the appointment of a receiver
and an asset freeze,] 'it is for the federal courts to adjust their remedies so as to grant
necessary relief where federally secured rights are invaded.' 42
V. The Reasoning of the Supreme Court in Alliance Bond Fund
A. Majority Opinion
The tradition of equitable relief in the United States "is an authority to administer in
equity suits the principles of the system of judicial remedies which had been devised and
was being administered by the English Courts of Chancery at the time of the separation
of the two countries. '43 Delivering the opinion for the Court, Justice Scalia explains the
chief reason for reversing the Court of Appeals is, "[t]he substantive prerequisites for
obtaining an equitabl& remedy as well as the general availability of injunctive relief...
depend on traditional principles of equity jurisdiction.'
Justice Scalia relies chiefly on this aspect of history; the only equity relief available
today is that which was available at the time of separation from England. Federal Rule
of Civil Procedure 65 does not alter the substantive prerequisites for obtaining an equi-
table remedy as well as the general availability of injunctive relief.45 Whether Rule 65
avails plaintiffs to equity relief depends on "traditional principles of equity jurisdic-
tion."46
The Court first eliminates the suggestion that the equity relief sought by Alliance
Bond Fund is analogous to the equity relief sought in cases involving a "creditor's
bill.""7 This form of equity relief allows a judgment creditor to "discover the debtor's
assets, to reach equitable interests not subject to execution at law, and to set aside
fraudulent conveyances." 48 Distinguishing the circumstance of Alliance Bond Fund
from the creditor's bill situation, the Court points out that the present case seeks an in-
junction prior to an entered judgment, whereas a creditor's bill was available only to a
judgment holding creditor.
49
After discussing the creditor's bills requirement of a judgment before an injunction
could be issued, the Court reiterates the general rule that a judgment establishing a debt
was necessary before a court of equity would interfere with the debtor's use of the
debtor's property.50 The merger of law and equity under the rules has not changed the
general presumption of equity principles prior to judgment. Scalia opines
"[n]otwithstanding the fusion of law and equity by the Rules of Civil Procedure the
41. 458 F.2d 1082 (2d Cir. 1972).
42. Id. at 1103 (footnote omitted).
43. See Grupo Mexicano De Desarrollo, S.A. v. Alliance Bond Fund 1195 S. Ct. at 1968 (quoting Atlas
Life Ins. Co. v. W.I. Southern, Inc., 306 U.S. 563, 568 (1939)).
44. Id. at 1968 (quoting 1 A C. WRIGHT, A. MILLER, & M. KANE, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE




48. Id. (footnotes omitted).
49. See Alliance Bond Fund, 119 S. Ct. at 1968.
50. See Id. at 1968-69.
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substantive principles of Courts of Chancery remain unaffected. '51 Furthermore, the
Court found that
[e]ven in the absence of historical support, we would not be inclined to believe that it
is merely a question of procedure whether a person's unencumbered assets can be
frozen by general-creditor claimants before their claims have been vindicated by
judgment. It seems to us that question goes to the substantive rights of all property
owners.
52
Since equity jurisdiction in the United States is what was exercised by the High
Court of Chancery at the time of separation from England, the Court turned toward
England for instruction. The opinion points to the fact that the English courts did not
provide a prejudgment injunctive remedy until 1975 as a strong argument that federal
courts should continue to be reluctant in granting preliminary injunctions.
5 3 Specifi-
cally, the British Court of Appeal decided Mareva Compania Naviera S.A. v. Interna-
tional Bulkcarriers S.A54. in 1975, holding that the "court has no power to protect a
creditor before he gets judgment." 55 While acknowledging that England has moved
away from the traditional equity principle of not granting prejudgment injunctions, the
Supreme Court finds that it is "incompatible with our traditionally cautious approach to
equitable powers."
56
The Court suggests lastly that, if the remedy were granted, Rule 64 of the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure would be rendered irrelevant. Rule 64 authorizes the use of
state prejudgment remedies. As another consequence of granting the requested relief, the
Court foresees, the disruption of the balance between debtors' and creditors' rights es-
tablished by centuries' enactment of state laws.
57
The majority opinion addresses the post-merger cases Deckert, First National City
Bank, and De BEERS Consol. Mines. Justice Scalia distinguishes Deckert by finding
that "[tihe preliminary relief available in a suit seeking equitable relief has nothing to do
with the preliminary relief available in a creditor's bill seeking equitable assistance in
the collection of a legal debt.",5 8 Furthermore, the Court found Deckert not controlling
because "the bill states a cause [of action] for equitable relief."59
Unsurprisingly, the second principal Supreme Court case to grant preliminary in-
junctions was also distinguished by the Court. Specifically, the majority opinion distin-
guished United States v. First National City Bank on three grounds. First, the Court
recognizes the injunction being sought in First National was being sought pursuant to a
statute authorizing tax injunctions. Second, courts of equity will "go much farther both
to give and withhold relief in furtherance of the public interest than they are accustomed
to go when only private interests are involved." 6 Lastly, the Court points out that the
51. Id. at 1970 (quoting Stainback, 336 U.S. at 382, n. 26 (1949)).
52. Id.
53. See Id. at 1972.
54. 2 Lloyd's Rep. 509. "Apparently the first 'Mareva Injunction' was actually issued in Nippon Yusen
Kaisha v. Karageorgis, 1975. 2 Lloyd's Rep. 137 (C.A.), in which Lord Denning recognized the prior practice
of not granting such injunctions, but stated that "the time has come when we should revise our practice."" Id.
at 138; see also Hetherington, Introduction to the Mareva Injunction, in Mareva Injunctions 1, n. I (M.
Hetherington, ed. 1983)." Grupo Mexicano, 119 S. Ct. at 1973, footnote 9.
55. Alliance Bond Fund, 119 S. Ct. at 1973, n. 10.
56. Id. at 1972-73.
57. Laws related to bankruptcy, fraudulent conveyances, and preferences.
58. Alliance Bond Fund, 119 S. Ct. at 1971.
59. Deckert, 311 U.S. at 288.




creditor had an equitable lien on the property, which is different than an unsecured gen-
eral creditor.
The Court agreed with the principles set forth in De Beers Consol. Mines Ltd. v.
United States61 which held in a suit seeking equitable relief against alleged antitrust
violations, that a preliminary injunction is inappropriate. The long history of equity ju-
risprudence does not allow for an interference with debtor's rights, "disabling him to use
so much of his funds or property as the court deems necessary for security or compli-
ance with its possible decree. 6 z
B. The Dissent
An analysis of history does not necessarily dictate the outcome reached by the Court
in Alliance Bond Fund. The dissent's discussion of history provides the American Bond
Fund with preliminary injunctive relief. "The Judiciary Act of 1789 gave the lower
courts jurisdiction over 'all suits ... in equity.' 63 The Supreme Court has interpreted
this jurisdiction over suits in equity to confer the "authority to administer ... the princi-
ples of the system of judicial remedies which had been devised and was being adminis-
tered '64 by the English Courts at the time of separation. Justice Ginsburg, writing for the
dissent, argued that the Court "long ago recognized that district courts properly exercise
their equitable jurisdiction where 'the remedy in equity could alone furnish relief, and..
• the ends of justice require the injunction to be issued."' 65 Federal courts further have
the authority to use their judicial discretion in the form of provisional relief to preserve
the status of the case at bar pending the outcome of the case.66 The District Court in this
case acted completely in accordance with these principles, using its discretion to grant
the "preliminary injunction only upon well-supported findings that Alliance had '[no]
adequate remedy at law.' 67 Historically courts have always valued the adaptable char-
acter of federal equitable power.68 "[A] court of equity has unquestionable authority to
apply its flexible comprehensive jurisdiction in such manner as might be necessary to
the right administration of justice between the parties."
69
VI. Commentary on Alliance Bond Fund
At the end of the day the Supreme Court merely presented a historical argument for
why courts should not exercise their equity jurisdiction. This section discusses weak-
nesses of the Courts' analysis. Included in this discussion are arguments regarding why
a static view of equity jurisdiction is inappropriate. Also discussed are issues raised
pertaining to the Court's analysis of both the All Writs Act and Rule 65.
61. 325 U.S. 212 (1945).
62. Id. at 222.
63. Alliance Bond Fund, 119 S. Ct. at 1976.
64. Id. at 1976, (quoting Atlas Life Ins. Co. v. W.I. Southern, Inc., 306 U.S. 563, 568 (1939)).
65. Id. at 1976, (quoting Watson v. Sutherland, 72 U.S. 74, 79 (1867)).
66. 11 A C. WRIGHT, A. MILLER, & M. KANE, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 2943, p. 79 (1995).
67. Alliance Bond Fund, 119 S. Ct. at 1975.
68. "We have also recognized that equity must evolve over time, 'in order to meet the requirements of
every case, and to satisfy the needs of a progressive social condition in which new primary rights and duties
are constantly committed."' Union Pacific R. Co. v. Chicago, R. I. & P.R.Co., 163 U.S. 564, 601 (1896). See
also 1 J. POMEROY, EQUITY JURISPRUDENCE § 67, 89 (S. Symons 5th ed. 1941) (the "American system of
equity is preserved and maintained ... to render the national jurisprudence as a whole adequate to the social
needs . . . . [lit possesses an inherent capacity of expansion, so as to keep abreast of each succeeding
generation and age.").
69. Hecht Co. v. Bowles, 321 U.S. 321, 329 (1944).
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A. Flaws in the Reasoning of Alliance Bond Fund
1. The Alliance Court's Static View of Equity Relief
In the opinion, the majority acknowledges that "there is nothing new about debtors'
trying to avoid paying their debts, or seeking to favor some creditors over others - or
even about their seeking to achieve these ends through 'sophisticated... strategies. '7
Given that debtors are prone to this behavior, it should not be beyond the powers of
equity jurisdiction to protect the creditor. The Court holds on to an unreasonable static
conception of equity jurisdiction, one that existed during the Revolutionary War era of
legal jurisprudence. Although it may be true that federal equity jurisdiction has been
defined by the principles of England at that time, there is no doctrine that requires fed-
eral jurisdiction in equity to be limited to those specific practices and remedies of the
pre-Revolutionary era. We no longer live in an "age of slow-moving capital and com-
paratively immobile wealth,' so federal courts should not necessarily practice the prin-
ciples of that world.
Although the Court acknowledges that the "age of slow-moving capital and com-
paratively immobile wealth" is over, it cannot or will not foresee the consequences of
this decision. An unwavering adherence to this view of equity relief that was perhaps
acceptable in a different age effectively allows dead-beats and fly-by-nighters to dissi-
pate their assets, leaving their victims without hope of satisfying any judgment they
might receive. Corporations are left largely unaffected by this decision. Their assets are
sufficiently large and immobile so as to prevent them from being dissipated. Likewise,
on the other end of the spectrum are the small-time frauds and petty swindlers who lack
significant assets, making preliminary injunctions unnecessary. Ultimately those that fall
in that middle category, between the large corporations and the small time crooks, bene-
fit from this decision. It is unlikely the Court would hand down a decision to benefit
dead-beats, and the fact that it has, raises questions as to the soundness of the decision.
2. The Court's Misconstrued Application of the All Writs Act and Rule 65
The majority opinion raises questions relating both to Rule 65 and the All Writs
Act72 without addressing them at length. This Section explores the possibilities and
problems that arise when these issues are explored.
a. The All Writs Act
In American Bond Fund, the Court distinguished First National, finding that it in-
volved, "powers under the statute authorizing issuance of tax injunction. 7 3 Looking to
footnote 8 of the opinion, the Court references the All Writs Act, particularly the argu-
ment made in the Brief for the United States. The United States as Amicus Curiae ar-
gued "that there is statutory support for the present injunction in the All Writs Act. 74 In
response, the opinion states: "we have said that the power conferred by the predecessor
of that provision is defined by 'what is the usage, and what are the principles of equity
applicable in such a case.' That is the very inquiry in which we have engaged.
'75
An inquiry into the All Writs Act should have little to do with the inquiry the Court
engages in involving the traditional principles of equity. Jurisprudentially, they are and
70. Alliance Bond Fund, 119 S. Ct at 1970.
71. Id. at 1969.
72. 28 U.S.C. § 1651 (1948).
73. Alliance Bond Fund, 119 S. Ct at 1971.
74. Id. at 1971, n.8.
75. Id. n.8 (quoting De BEERS Consol. Mines, Ltd. v. United States, 325 U.S. 212, 219 (1945)).
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have been two separate vehicles for relief. The Act provides that, "[t]he Supreme Court
and all courts established by Act of Congress may issue all writs necessary or appropri-
ate in aid of their respective jurisdictions and agreeable to the usages and principles of
law., 7 6 The All Writs Act provides courts with a standing inherent power to issue a
preliminary injunction to preserve the status quo.77 This authorizes courts to implement
their powers to ensure a potential judgment. The traditional principles of equity the ma-
jority in American Bond Fund discusses provide a distinct remedy from the statutory
authority pursuant to the All Writs Act, and the Court ought to have engaged in a dis-
cussion of relief under this provision separate from the discussion about equity princi-
ples.
Under the All Writs Act, the traditional criteria of the likelihood of success, irrepa-
rable harm, balance of harm, and public interest are to be applied. Under the modem
view, these factors must be evaluated in combination. This stems from the recognition
that, where certain aspects of the test are strongly shown, the showing on the other fac-
tors may be lessened.78 Whether requiring all the criteria or the standard of the modem
view, the American funds are entitled to the relief sought pursuant to the Act.
b. Rule 65
Traditionally, Rule 65 is "firmly grounded in the pre-rule federal practice in injunc-
tion suits ... the general availability of injunctive relief ... [is] not altered by the rule
and depend[s] on traditional principles of equity jurisdiction., 79 Under general federal
equity jurisprudence, issuing an injunction or a temporary restraining order is a matter of
discretion and not of right.80 The test for exercising this discretion in granting a prelimi-
nary injunction traditionally has emphasized four factors: 1) irreparable harm to the
plaintiff, 2) balance of interests of the plaintiff and the defendant, 3) probability of suc-
cess on the merits, and 4) the public interest, irreparable injury or serious question and
balance of the hardships. 81 Some courts have reformulated these factors eliminating one
or stressing others but, generally these factors are formulated and applied in the tradi-
tional fashion.
In the Alliance Bond Fund majority opinion, there appears to be the suggestion that
the application of Rule 65 will no longer depend on one set of the traditional factors.
Instead the Court suggests in footnote 3 of the opinion, that application of Rule 65 cre-
ates an Erie question. The Court raises this question, but then declines to answer it;
"[pletioners argue for the first time before this Court that under Erie R. Co. v. Thomp-
kins,82 the availability of this injunction under Rule 65 should be determined by the law
of the forum state (in this case New York). Because this argument was neither raised nor
76. 28 U.S.C. §1651(a).
77. See F.T.C. v. Dean Foods Co., 384 U.S. 597, 603-605 (preliminary injunction issued to prevent
merger).
78. The parameters of the burden that the applicant must meet under the sliding scale evaluation have been
summarized by the 10th Circuit in Lundgrin v. Claytor, 619 F.2d 61, 63 (10th Cir. 1980).
79. 11 C. WRIGHT & A. MILLER, supra note 52, § 2941, at 359. See generally Developments in the Law -
Injunctions 78 HARV. L. REV. 996 (1965).
80. Lemon v. Kurtzman, 411 U.S. 192, 200 (1973) ("equitable remedies are a special blend of what is
necessary, what is fair, and what is workable."); Hecht Co. v. Bowles, 321 U.S. 321, 328-29 (the language
"shall be granted" dues not make injunction mandatory); Sports Form, Inc. v. United Press Int'l, 686 F.2d 750,
752-54 (9th Cir. 1982) (standard of review is abuse of discretion).
81. 11 C. WRIGHT & A. MILLER supra note 52, § 2948.
82. Grupo Mexicano De Desarrollo, S.A. v. Alliance Bond Fund, Inc., 527 U.S. 308, 119 S. Ct. 1961,
1968 (1999)(citing 304 U.S. 64 (1938).
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considered below, we decline to consider it."'83 However, instead of limiting the Rule 65
analysis to federal equity principles, the Court opens Pandora's box. The application of
Rule 65 in an "Erie" fashion would become a quagmire of state practices and laws. The
direction of the Court on Rule 65 is uncertain, but if it continued on this course, it would
certainly change the traditional application of injunctive relief. Considering the chief
argument of the majority opinion demonstrates a reluctance to move away from tradi-
tional applications of equity principles, the Court should follow its own advice and ap-
ply Rule 65 how it has traditionally been applied.
An argument can be made that the application of Rule 65 already exists as a hodge-
podge of criteria applied in an equally confusing manner by the federal circuit courts.
Although this may be the case there is no codified directive that authorizes the federal
courts to rule in this way. Whether this is what Justice Scalia purports to create is un-
clear. However, he raises the issue and for future Rule 65 cases, this may be a relevant
avenue of litigation.
3. Alliance's Treatment of the Post-Merger Cases
This section suggests that the Court's treatment of the three Supreme Court cases
dealing with preliminary injunctions prior to Alliance Bond Fund is less than accurate.
84
Taken altogether, the three cases support the availability of a preliminary injunction to
freeze assets which may be subject to an equitable decree when the judgment is en-
tered85 It can be said that in the case of a future money judgments, such as First Na-
tional, a preliminary injunction would also be available.
86
a. Deckert v. Independence Shares Corporation 87
Deckert involved several purchasers who brought a suit in equity to rescind the
fraudulent sale of securities and to obtain restitution. The monies necessary to satisfy the
purchaser's claim were in the hands of a third-party trustee, named as a defendant, but
not as a violator. The suit was brought pursuant to 15 U.S.C. § 77(v),88 where the Su-
preme Court upheld the freeze.
The reasoning of Deckert speaks to the issue of allowing preliminary injunctions to
"protect a final equitable remedy of restitution or constructive trust.' 89 Deckert is appli-
cable only to those seeking preliminary injunctions having an equitable claim to hold-
ings within the possession of defendants, therefore its inappropriate to apply it to a case
where the plaintiff seeks money damages as a final remedy. 90
83. Id.
84. "We have on three occasions considered the availability of a preliminary injunction to freeze assets
pending litigation .... These cases involved factual and legal circumstances markedly different from those
presented in this case and thus do not rule out or in the provisional remedy at issue here." (Ginsburg, dissent)
Id. at 1967 n.3.
85. See Ronda Wasserman, Equity Renewals: Preliminary Injunctions to Secure Potential Money
Judgments, 67 WASH. L. REV. 257, 318 (1992).
86. Id. at 318.
87. 311 U.S. 282 (1940).
88. 15 U.S.C. § 77v (1999) (granting district courts jurisdiction over suits brought to enforce any liability
under the securities act).
89. Wasserman, supra note 80, at 311.
90. Id. at 312.
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b. De BEERS Consolidated Mines, Ltd. v. United States9'
The majority opinion in Alliance Bond Fund, finds De BEERS92 strongly supportive
of the position that preliminary injunctions are not a remedy within the federal court's
equity jurisdiction. The Court in De BEERS presented a slippery slope argument that
suggested a "plaintiff in any action for a personal judgment in tort or contract may not,
also, apply to the chancellor for a so-called injunction sequestrating his opponent's as-
sets pending recovery and satisfaction of a judgment in such a law action. 93 Although
dicta, the last statement was persuasive to the Court in Alliance Bond Fund.
An accurate reading of De BEERS would limit it. The Third Circuit has done that by
finding, it "simply held that a defendant's money may not be encumbered by a prelimi-
nary injunction when the final merits judgment sought by plaintiffs cannot involve a
transfer of money from defendants to plaintiffs. Similar to Deckert, De BEERS is inap-
plicable to a case where the plaintiff is seeking money damages."94
c. United States v. First National City Bank95
Of the three post-merger cases, First National is the most relevant to preliminary
injunctive relief in money damages cases. In First National, the government sought to
freeze the assets of several banks and brokerage firms to prevent them from dissipating
their holdings, rendering them judgment-proof. After the Second Circuit reversed the
district court's grant of injunctive relief, the Supreme Court reaffirmed the district court
decision. First National presents a unique situation. According to the Court, "[c]ourts of
equity may, and frequently do, go much further both to give and withhold relief in fur-
therance of the public interest than they are accustomed to go when only private inter-
ests are involved., 9 6 This is the case which is most relevant to Alliance Bond Fund. The
Court in First National quoted both De BEERS and Deckert and found the injunction
appropriate to "preserve the status quo" because the assets to be enjoined were to be the
"subject of the provisions of any final decree in the cause. 97 Ultimately, the result was
to freeze the defendant's assets in order to ensure a future money judgment, which the
American funds in Alliance Bond Fund should be equally entitled to as well.
VII. Existing Methods To Obtain Preliminary Injunctions
The legal system is no stranger to preliminary injunctions. Injunctive relief is al-
ready available in a number of areas. The American state court system offers one exam-
ple, such as in New York. In New York, preliminary injunctions are available through
means other than Rule 65. Another forum where preliminary injunctions are available is
the English legal system, which authorizes relief in the form of Mareva injunctions.
A. State Courts
New York provides for pre-judgment injunctions for debtors who establish and
maintain assets in New York. This remedy is set out in the New York Rules of Civil
Procedure issuing preliminary injunctions in a case for money damages where, "the
91. 325 U.S. 212 (1945).
,92. Where the United States brought suit against several corporations seeking equitable relief against
alleged antitrust violations. The United States sought a preliminary injunction restraining the defendants from
removing their assets from this country pending adjudication of the merits.
93. De BEERS, 325 U.S. at 222-223.
94. Wasserman, supra n. 80, at 314.
95. 379 U.S. 378 (1965).
96. Id. at 383 (quoting Virginia Ry. Co. v. Federation, 300 U.S. 515, 552 (1937)).
97. 379 U.S. at 385.
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defendant is a non-domiciliary residing without the state, or is a foreign corporation not
qualified to do business in the state." 98 Extremely broad in its scope, this is an alterna-
tive available also to creditors in Australia, Bermuda, the Bahamas, the Cayman Islands,
Canada, Hong Kong, Singapore, Malaysia, New Zealand and the Republic of Ireland.99
Colorado also statutorily provides pre-judgment injunctive relief for money dam-
ages. It is one of twenty-nine states °0 to enact state RICO legislation, including provi-
sions for granting interlocutory injunctions. Colorado's RICO statute'0 ' expressly per-
mits the grant of injunctive relief to a private plaintiff in conformity with the principles
that govern the granting of injunctions from threatened loss or damage in other civil
cases, except that no showing of special or irreparable damage to the plaintiff has to be
made.10 2 In the case of a debtor dissipating assets, an injunction under this statute would
be appropriate. FDIC v. Antonio10 3 is illustrative of a preliminary freeze under this stat-
ute in order to ensure money damages. The District Court addresses the question of
whether there exists the authority, by preliminary injunction, to prevent dissipation of
the defendant's assets necessary to satisfy a potential judgment, without proof that the
assets are the product of wrongdoing. Finding that the authority to grant such injunctions
does exist, the Court supports its view citing the Colorado statute which "expressly pro-





Preliminary injunctions were not available in England'0 5 until 1975, when the Eng-
lish Court of Appeal granted a freeze of assets in Mareva Compania Naviera S.A. v. Int'l
Bulkcarriers S.A.' °6 The owners (plaintiffs) chartered out their ship, the Mareva, to for-
eign defendants for $3850 (f or $) per day. After paying the first two payments on time,
the defendants subsequently failed to pay the third. In an action that was at law for debt,
the plaintiffs sued to collect the money due to them. Fearing that the defendant's assets
in a London bank would be dissipated, the plaintiffs sought a preliminary injunction.
98. N.Y. C.P.L.R 6201 (Consol. 1999).
99. Clyde Mitchell, Limits on Federal Court Injunctions in Aid of Creditors, N.Y.L.J., Oct. 1999, at n. 18.
100. G. Robert Blakey and Thomas A. Perry, An Analysis of the Myths That Bolster Efforts to Rewrite
RICO and the Various Proposals for Reform: "Mother of God - Is this the End of RICO?" 43 VAND. L.
REV. 851 (1990).
101. COLO. REv. STAT. §§ 18-17-106 (6) (1981).
102. The statute states:
Any aggrieved person may institute a proceeding, under subsection (1) of this section.
In such proceeding, relief shall be granted in conformity with the principles that
govern that granting of injunctive relief from threatened loss or damage in other civil
cases; except that no showing of special or irreparable damage to the person shall
have to be made. Upon the execution of proper bond against damages for an
injunction improvidently granted and a showing of immediate danger of significant
loss or damage, a temporary restraining order and a preliminary injunction may be
issued in any such action before a final determination on the merits
Id.
103. 649 F. Supp 1352 (D. Colo. 1986).
104. Id. at 1354.
105. For a historic review, See Rasu Maritima v. Pertambangan [1977] 3 All. E.R. 324, 331-32 (C.A.
Denning, J.).
106. [1980] 1 All E.R. 213 (C.A. 1975). The injunction granted in Mareva was the second granted in a
couplet of cases. The first case was Nippon Yusen Kaisha v. Karageorgis [1975] 1 W.L.R. 1093 (C.A.). See
also Prince Abdul v. Abu-Taha [1908] 3 All. E.R. 409, 412. The present state of English law, in which such
injunctions are fairly easy obtained, is reflected in Bayer A.G. v. Winter, [1986] 1 All. E.R. 733, 737(C.A.).
See generally Profits of Crime and Their Recovery: Report of Howard League for Penal Reform 104-111
(1984) (discussion of Mareva injunctions).
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The English Court granted the injunction holding that if a "debt is due and owing,
and there is a danger that the debtor may dispose of his assets so as to defeat it before
judgment, the court has jurisdiction in a proper case to grant an interlocutory judgment
so as to prevent him from disposing of those assets."' 0 7 Noting that the defendants could
at any moment withdraw their funds from the London bank, the court granted a freeze of
their assets.
A Mareva injunction is available to a creditor if the creditor can prove three things:
(1) a good arguable case, a requirement that is similar to the American standard of like-
lihood to succeed on the merits standard, (2) the existence and location of the assets,
which if located would have an effect, and (3) that there is a real risk of irreparable
harm. This last criterion may be proven by demonstrating that the assets are quickly
transferable and that the owners of the assets are abroad. Additionally, the court must
determine that granting the injunction is necessary under the circumstances. Mareva
injunctions may reach both domiciled parties and non-domiciled parties who are subject
to the court's jurisdiction. In turn, there are several protections provided for the debtor.
For example, the amount to be restrained must be limited and the defendant has access
to other funds for, among other things, day to day expenses, attorney's fees, and cost of
living expenses.'
0 8
VIII. Living With Alliance Bond Fund
There are two groups who feel the impact of the holding in Alliance Bond Fund:
lower federal courts and those unsecured American creditors seeking to do business with
foreign debtors 10 9 Lower federal courts must wield their general equitable jurisdiction
with extreme caution in cases where the claim is a legal one for equitable damages."
0
Perhaps affected in a larger sense are ". . . creditors, like that/those in Alliance Bond
Fund." Unsecured creditors are encouraged to "better protect themselves from actions
by non-U.S. debtors that may frustrate a traditional breach of contract action following a
default.""'1
Creditors are left with few options. It would be to their benefit them to either con-
tract for better protections in the event that a default on payments occurs, or to do what
this Note suggests, endeavor to pass legislation expressly allowing for preliminary in-
junctive relief of this nature." 2
To the end of better protecting themselves, the unsecured creditors should first, if
the debtor holds assets in England, contract for English forum and law so as to allow for
Mareva injunctions should the need arise. Second, unsecured creditors should research
the various laws within the American states and require the debtor to perform transac-
tions in a state where injunctive relief of this nature is granted according to state law.
Lastly, creditors should include in their contracts provisions that, after default, prohibit
the debtor from performing certain transactions to other creditors without lender ap-
proval." 1
3
The stark reality of the consequences of Alliance Bond Fund is the virtual overruling
of Deckert and First National. In those cases, pursuant to a grant in equity jurisdic-
107. Mareva [19801 1 All E.R. at 215 (Denning, M.R.) (quoting Beddow v. Beddow, 9 Ch. D. 89 (1878)).
108. Wasserman, supra n. 80, at 343-44.




113. Id. at 6-7.
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tion, 14 the Court found it well within its equity jurisdiction to wield the tool of a pre-
liminary injunction. The circuit courts interpreted those decisions to mean that prelimi-
nary injunctions were an available tool of the court's equity powers. Currently, Justice
Scalia has effectively overruled prior landmark Supreme Court decisions. Circuit courts
have begun and will continue to implement this new view of equity powers. Deckert and
First National are now dead.
In Haven v. Poland'15 the District Court was presented with the same claim for relief
that faced the Alliance Bond Fund court: a grant of injunctive relief in a suit for money
damages. The case involved a class action suit involving former Polish nationals at-
tempting to sue the Polish treasury on a claim relating to matters during the World War
II period. While dismissing the case for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, the district
court held that even if there were subject matter jurisdiction, a federal court lacked the
authority to serve "as the enforcing agent for matters of conscience, or of justice in the
abstract."l 6The District Court cites the Supreme Court's holding in Alliance Bond Fund
limiting the power of federal courts in equity matters.
In Haven the court states, "no federal court is vested with a roving commission to
force any foreign government to do equity. If any such government fails or refuses to act
in its governmental capacity as conscience would command, no federal court is empow-
ered to force it to do so except as Congress has specified."
'" 7
IX. Conclusion
In American Bond Fund, Justice Scalia, relying on an original intent argument,
maintains that the initial intent of the Judiciary Act of 1789 was not to include prelimi-
nary injunctive relief as part of equity jurisdiction. Since the Judiciary Act codified the
English principles of equity relief, and given that they were not available under English
law at that time, it is not within the powers of the Court to grant the remedy today. To
do so would be an unacceptable expansion of federal judicial powers. Despite England's
departure from traditional equity jurisdiction in the form of the Mareva injunctions,
courts lack the authority to depart minus a direct grant of power from Congress.
This Note presents a commentary on Alliance Bond Fund and the issues it raises.
It primarily suggests that history should not be the motivation to protect debtors who
endeavor to frustrate future judgments. Congress can take action to prevent this from
happening through statutory reform by passing legislation in support of Mareva-style
injunctions in the United States. The Supreme Court's original intent argument should
not bar creditors from satisfying a potential judgment.
Both the decisions in Alliance Bond Fund and Haven v. Poland point to the need
for Congress to implement new legislation. There is scant recourse for victims of debt-
ors whose actions are not as "conscience would command.""' 8 Although the Haven
court acknowledges the possibility that justice will not be served, the court will not be
swayed by the fact that, "plaintiffs cannot obtain justice (or even a fair trial) in the Pol-
ish courts."'"19 Although justice often dictates that injunctive relief be granted, federal
114. The initial grant in equity jurisdiction came in the form of an SEC statute and a tax statute, but neither
of them expressly provide for preliminary injunctions.
115. See supra note, 6. Although mentioned in support of the holding for lack of equity jurisdiction, the
historical argument Justice Scalia puts forth in Alliance Bond Fund is not what seems to be the overriding
concern to the Haven court. The District Court grapples with an issue not mentioned by the majority opinion in
Alliance Bond Fund, specifically the extra-territoriality concerns with exercising equity jurisdiction.
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